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[1003] 
Notes 
Preserving Dignity in Due Process 
Sara B. Tosdal* 
Procedural due process is a guarantee of fairness. Fundamentally, this guarantee requires 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Procedural protections from arbitrary state action 
vary according to the context of each case, and protections in administrative actions are 
distinct from those provided in formal judicial proceedings. The administrative state 
developed to address a pressing need: how to govern and regulate when the three 
branches of government lack the capacity to efficiently and effectively administer an ever-
evolving society. But as society has developed and expanded, individuals have more 
frequently interacted with the administrative state, in turn necessitating the expansion of 
procedural due process into an area of law that prioritizes efficiency over individual 
rights. 
Both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have addressed 
this tension, but with different emphases. Where the U.S. Supreme Court applies a narrow 
constitutional threshold for rights implicating procedural protections, the California 
Supreme Court applies a more expansive threshold, with a particular focus on the dignity 
of the individual confronted with an adverse state action. Where the U.S. Supreme Court 
uses a three-factor balancing test for procedural adequacy, the California Supreme Court 
has articulated a four-factor balancing test that recognizes a person’s dignitary interest in 
procedural protections against the state. 
However, California’s due process analysis has been applied haphazardly, at best, 
leading to confusion amongst appellate courts. This Note argues that uneven application 
of the doctrine stems from unclear guidance from the California Supreme Court in the 
first instance and, ultimately, demeans the dignitary interest. After outlining the federal 
and state frameworks and explaining the misapplication of the California due process 
tests by the state’s courts, this Note urges a clearer definition of the due process trigger and 
more vigorous consideration of the dignitary interest in order to achieve a truer 
appreciation for and greater protection of an individual’s position before a state actor. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. I would like to 
thank Professor Reuel Schiller for his advice and enthusiasm, the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for 
their diligence and good humor, the many people who read and commented on this Note, and my friends 
and family for all of their love and support. I owe special thanks to my sister, Alicia Tosdal, for her 
generosity and strength. 
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“From its founding, the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster 
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.”1 
 
Introduction 
Justice Frankfurter once wrote, “The requirement of ‘due process’ is 
not a fair-weather or timid assurance.”2 Due process is one of the most 
august concepts in American law, enshrined in both the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights, and protective of both substantive and procedural 
rights.3 It is “compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, 
and stout confidence in the strength of [our] democratic faith . . . .”4 At 
 
 1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970). 
 2. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 3. Id. at 174 (“Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional 
system.”). 
 4. Id. at 162–63. 
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its core, due process concerns procedural fairness, which serves as a 
buffer between the people and government action and is “our main 
assurance that there will be equal justice under law.”5 Due process 
affirms a person’s identity and recognizes her inherent dignity when 
confronted by the state; it does so by mandating some form of notice and 
opportunity to be heard prior to being harmed by a state actor.6 
Procedural due process is particularly vital for guarding the individual 
from arbitrary deprivations by administrative agencies, as these are the 
sites of most encounters between individuals and the state—and, 
arguably, where the state actor is least accountable to the individual. 
The United States Supreme Court has highlighted the importance of 
recognizing and protecting an individual’s rights and interests in the face 
of adverse state action by administrative agencies in Goldberg v. Kelly,7 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth8 and Mathews v. Eldridge.9 The 
California Supreme Court followed suit in the development of its own 
procedural due process doctrine. The seminal California case, People v. 
Ramirez, focuses on a person’s dignitary interest as a central component 
of the state’s procedural due process doctrine.10 However, the subsequent 
application of Ramirez has become confused and unpredictable, 
requiring a reexamination of the state’s procedural due process tests to 
ensure that it fulfills the promise of due process protections. 
This Note describes ongoing inconsistencies in California 
procedural due process doctrine and argues that the California due 
process tests ought to be as vigorous and expansive as the California 
Supreme Court in Ramirez intended them to be. Part I briefly outlines 
the underlying principles and history of both procedural due process and 
the administrative state. Part I further sets forth the respective federal 
and California due process frameworks and highlights the differences 
between them, concentrating on Ramirez’s emphasis on protecting an 
individual’s dignity. Part II examines appellate courts’ application of the 
California frameworks and evaluates the results. Part II ultimately 
demonstrates that the application of the California due process doctrine 
is, at best, inconsistent and does not lead to substantially different results 
than the federal doctrine. It asserts that the incoherent application of the 
California doctrine shows its ineffectiveness in accomplishing Ramirez’s 
original goal: restoring fundamental tenets of due process to the heart of 
the due process analysis. 
 
 5. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 6. See id. at 170 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 7. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 8. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 9. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 10. 599 P.2d 622, 627 (Cal. 1979). 
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Finally, Part III analyzes possible solutions to help the California 
courts achieve the original purpose of Ramirez. It proposes two possible 
solutions to the problem. The California courts could easily continue to 
apply the federal procedural due process thresholds that were expressly 
rejected in Ramirez. But the California Supreme Court has not yet 
abandoned this position, and the continued use of the federal test 
contravenes binding precedent from the state’s highest court. Moreover, 
adopting the federal framework would fail to recognize the inherent 
dignity of an individual facing a more powerful state actor for the 
purported benefit of lowering administrative costs and increasing 
government efficiency. Instead, California courts should rearticulate the 
state’s procedural due process doctrine in order to realize the intent and 
potential of the Ramirez decision. 
I.  Background 
Due process is an old, enduring concept.11 A “guarantee of fair 
procedure”12 in administrative and judicial adjudicative contexts,13 the 
touchstone of due process has long been protecting individuals against 
arbitrary state action14 by providing notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.15 “The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for 
 
 11. Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn and Byse’s Administrative Law: Cases and Comments 
768 (10th ed. 2003) (stating that due process was born in thirteenth century England); see also Edward 
L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 1044, 1044 (1984) (“By far the 
oldest of our civil rights, [procedural due process’s] content seemed so clear to prior generations that 
they included the term ‘due process’ in the fifth and fourteenth amendments virtually without 
discussion.” (footnote omitted)); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More 
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 111 (1978). 
 12. Strauss et al., supra note 11. 
 13. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (“[W]hen governmental agencies adjudicate or 
make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that 
those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. 
On the other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication . . . it is not 
necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.”). 
 14. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889) (stating that the requirements of due process, 
as conceived in England and transported to the United States, are designed to protect individual 
subjects from arbitrary state action). 
 15. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378 (2010) (“Due process 
requires notice ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” (quoting Mullane 
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract 
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that 
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The 
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. And it is to this end, of 
course, that summons or equivalent notice is employed.” (citation omitted)); Louisville & Nashville 
R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900) (“[The requirements of] the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . are complied with, provided in the proceedings which are claimed not to 
have been due process of law the person condemned has had sufficient notice and adequate 
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the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic 
government must therefore practice fairness . . . .”16 Recognition of a 
person’s dignity in the course of an encounter with a state actor is 
particularly important to procedural fairness, because such recognition 
respects these elementary rights and affirms that person’s membership in 
society.17 
The first administrative agencies emerged from the War 
Department, following Independence and the end of the Revolutionary 
War.18 Beginning with the New Deal, as the government struggled to 
address the impact of the Great Depression, administrative agencies like 
the Social Security Administration and the National Labor Relations 
Board became increasingly integral to the operation of the United 
States.19 Now, agencies administer nearly every aspect of American life, 
from dispensing drivers and professional licenses to determining 
eligibility for disability and welfare benefits; from regulating commercial 
activities to operating prisons; and from establishing tenure to providing 
for rehabilitation.20 Consequently, individuals frequently confront the 
government through administrative actions that affect some of the most 
fundamental aspects of their lives. 
The Constitution does not explicitly contemplate this method of 
governance. Article II charges the executive branch with the duty to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”21 Through the 
Appointments Clause, the President is further authorized to appoint 
“Officers of the United States,” though Congress retains the power to 
vest appointment of “inferior” officers in other branches of the 
government.22 Likewise, Congress is empowered to pass laws that are 
“necessary and proper” for executing those powers vested in the United 
States government “or in any Department or Officer thereof”23 by the 
 
opportunity has been afforded him to defend.”). 
 16. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 17. See Saphire, supra note 11, at 124. 
 18. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–
1801, 115 Yale L.J. 1256, 1274–76, 1283 (2006). 
 19. Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 17. 
 20. See Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of 
Bureaucracy 5 (1990). See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) 
(tenure); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (transfer of prisoners); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976) (disability benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); People v. 
Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622 (Cal. 1979) (rehabilitation); Smith v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 248 Cal. 
Rptr. 704 (Ct. App. 1988) (professional competency). 
 21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
 22. Id. § 2, cl. 2. 
 23. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Constitution. Thus, the Constitution provides for making law, 
interpreting law, and executing law, but is silent on administering law.24 
Instead, administration blossomed in the interstitial space between 
the branches of government.25 Administrative law developed in response 
to the burgeoning administrative state, concerned with governmental 
efficiency, preservation of individual rights, and social well-being.26 New 
Deal programs created a “reliance principle: The public came to look 
upon government as its guarantor against acute economic deprivation.”27 
Because government agencies multiplied without a regulatory 
framework, such as procedural safeguards, Congress passed the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946.28 The APA “divide[d] the 
universe of administrative action into two general decisionmaking 
categories, rulemaking and adjudication.”29 For adjudications, the statute 
“set[s] out a fairly elaborate scheme of procedural requirements[, using] 
the judicial hearing as its decisionmaking model.”30 California’s own 
Administrative Procedure Act31 predated the federal counterpart and 
“was a pioneering effort.”32 The administrative state has only expanded 
since the statutes were enacted: “We now presume the existence of 
highly institutionalized methods of presidential and congressional 
control, the impersonality of office, the hierarchical organization of a 
career civil service and a highly articulated system of judicial review.”33 
Despite the statutory constraints on administrative action, this expansion 
increases the chances of an arbitrary agency action by an administrative 
agency.34  
Since the New Deal, courts have struggled to address two central 
questions of due process in administrative actions: whether or not a 
 
 24. See Mashaw, supra note 18, at 1266. 
 25. Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 35. 
 26. Mashaw, supra note 18, at 1264; see also Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 
75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 614, 614 (1927) (“The control of banking, insurance, public utilities, finance, 
industry, the professions, health and morals, in sum, the manifold response of government to the 
forces and needs of modern society, is building up a body of laws not written by legislatures, and of 
adjudications not made by courts and not subject to their revision. These powers are lodged in a vast 
congeries of agencies.”). 
 27. Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 16. 
 28. See id.; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 29. See Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 16–17. 
 30. Id. at 17. 
 31. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 11340–11365 (West 1998). 
 32. Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on California’s 
New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 Tulsa L.J. 297, 298 (1996). The California statute was enacted 
in 1945. Id. One measure adopted by the original Act was independent hearing officers, which “has yet 
to be adopted by the federal government.” Id. 
 33. Mashaw, supra note 18, at 1269. 
 34. Edley, supra note 20, at 6 (“As the bureaucracy’s role has grown, so have the risks and 
benefits associated with official action.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The 
Struggle for Auto Safety 8 (1990) (“The individual and the social stakes in regulation are high.”). 
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particular state action triggers due process; and, once due process is 
implicated, what procedures are sufficient to protect an individual from 
arbitrary government action.35 For courts, these questions raise a “basic 
problem [of] translat[ing] a protection developed for judicial trials into 
the administrative context.”36 State courts have mostly adopted or 
applied due process tests akin to, or coextensive with, the federal test.37 
However, California is one state that has sought to expand the federal 
framework.38 In some respects, the California Supreme Court has been 
 
 35. Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 768. 
 36. Rubin, supra note 11, at 1046. 
 37. There are numerous examples of state courts relying on the federal due process doctrine. See 
City of Dora v. Beavers, 692 So. 2d 808, 811 n.4 (Ala. 1997); Moore v. Watson, 429 So. 2d 1036, 1038 
(Ala. 1983); Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31, 36 (Alaska 1980); In re MH-2008-
000867, 236 P.3d 405, 408–09 (Ariz. 2010); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.B., 286 S.W.3d 712, 719 
(Ark. 2008); Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248–49 (Colo. 2003); State v. Harris, 890 A.2d 559, 570 
(Conn. 2006); Hughes v. Div. of Family Servs. 836 A.2d 498, 508 & n.26 (Del. 2003); Brown v. United 
States, 682 A.2d 1131, 1139 (D.C. 1996); N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 
898, 903 & n.7 (Fla. 2003); Nodvin v. State Bar, 544 S.E.2d 142, 146 (Ga. 2001); Slupecki v. Admin. 
Dir. of the Courts, 133 P.3d 1199, 1205 (Haw. 2006); In re True, 645 P.2d 891, 894 (Idaho 1982); People 
ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 796 (Ill. 2009); Wilson v. Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 
385 N.E.2d 438, 443–44 (Ind. 1979); Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 770 N.W.2d 334, 
340 (Iowa 2009); State v. Easterling, 213 P.3d 418, 426 (Kan. 2009); Transp. Cabinet v. Cassity, 
912 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Ky. 1995); Arriola v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 809 So. 2d 932, 938–39 (La. 2002); In 
re Amberley D., 775 A.2d 1158, 1163 (Me. 2001); Rhoads v. Sommer, 931 A.2d 508, 525 (Md. 2007); 
Costa v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 903 N.E.2d 1098, 1109 (Mass. 2009); In re Rood, 763 N.W.2d 587, 598 
(Mich. 2009); C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. 2008); Hinds Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd. v. R.B., 
10 So. 3d 387, 402 (Miss. 2008); Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Mo. 2007); In re 
Mental Health of E.T., 191 P.3d 470, 474 (Mont. 2008); Kenley v. Neth, 712 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Neb. 
2006); J.D. Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Int’l Grp., LLC, 240 P.3d 1033, 1040 (Nev. 2010); In re Kilton, 939 
A.2d 198, 206 (N.H. 2007); Jamgochian v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 952 A.2d 1060, 1071 (N.J. 2008); 
Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util. Auth. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 229 P.3d 494, 507 
(N.M. 2010); In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 487 (N.Y. 2004); State v. Thompson, 508 S.E.2d 277, 286 (N.C. 
1998); In re D.C.S.H.C., 733 N.W.2d 902, 906 (N.D. 2007); State ex rel. Haylett v. Ohio Bureau of 
Workers’ Comp., 720 N.E.2d 901, 907–08 (Ohio 1999); In re A.M., 13 P.3d 484, 487–88 (Okla. 2000); 
Stogsdill v. Bd. of Parole, 154 P.3d 91, 94 (Or. 2007); R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 147 
(Pa. 1994); State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 576–77 (R.I. 2009); S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Wilson, 
574 S.E.2d 730, 734 (S.C. 2002); State v. $1,010.00 in Am. Currency, 722 N.W.2d 92, 97–98 (S.D. 2006); 
Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 230–31 (Tenn. 2010); Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 
315, 319–20 (Tex. 2009); In re Arnovick, 52 P.3d 1246, 1251 (Utah 2002); Gabriel v. Town of Duxbury, 
764 A.2d 1224, 1226 (Vt. 2000); Krieger v. Virginia, 567 S.E.2d 557, 564 (Va. Ct. App. 2002); Post v. 
City of Tacoma, 217 P.3d 1179, 1186 (Wash. 2009); State ex rel. Jeanette H. v. Pancake, 529 S.E.2d 865, 
874 (W. Va. 2000); In re Daniel R.S., 706 N.W.2d 269, 284–85 (Wis. 2005); In re CC, 102 P.3d 890, 895 
(Wyo. 2004). But see Jamgochian, 952 A.2d at 1070 (noting that the New Jersey due process doctrine 
can provide for greater procedural protection than the federal test). 
 38. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626–28 (Cal. 1979). Justice Mosk, author of the Ramirez 
opinion, once said that he hoped that he was able to protect people from “a monstrous society that 
grows constantly” while he was on the bench. Interview by Germaine LaBerge with Stanley Mosk, 
Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, in S.F., Cal. 93 (July 22, 1998), transcript available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/ 
archives/oral-history/pdf/mosk.pdf. Mosk’s opinion in Ramirez is emblematic of this approach: Mosk’s 
rationale for rejecting the federal due process doctrine suggests that his core concern was with 
protecting citizens from arbitrary deprivations in an increasingly bureaucratized society. See discussion 
infra Part I.B. 
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successful in providing greater protections for individuals at the mercy of 
state action. In others, however, the court has managed to muddy the 
waters so that the state due process framework no longer fulfills its 
original promise.  
A. The Federal Approach to Procedural Due Process 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”39 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”40 The 
U.S. Supreme Court crafted the federal due process framework in its 
decisions in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth41 and Mathews v. 
Eldridge.42 
1. Invoking Due Process 
Prior to Roth, access to due process protections depended on 
whether an affected individual’s interest could be characterized as a right 
or a privilege: Due process was not constitutionally required if the 
interest was not a right.43 For instance, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers 
Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, a short-order cook for a restaurant that 
served workers at the Naval Gun Factory suddenly and summarily had 
her security clearance revoked, which prevented her from going to 
work.44 The Court reasoned that her private interest in continued 
employment was not a right to continued employment, but was merely a 
privilege.45 Indeed, the Navy’s decision to revoke her security clearance 
did nothing to prevent her from finding employment elsewhere.46 
Procedural due process protections were not constitutionally required for 
privileges—only rights.47 
By comparison, the central inquiry of the modern approach, set 
forth in Roth, is whether the private interest in question constitutes 
either a liberty or a property interest as identified by the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendments.48 The Roth plaintiff taught at a state university 
 
 39. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 40. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 41. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 42. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 43. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Bailey v. 
Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
 44. 367 U.S. at 887–88, 894. 
 45. Id. at 896–99. 
 46. Id. at 898–99. 
 47. Id. at 896–99. 
 48. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 571 (1972); see also Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (deciding a due process challenge under the Fifth Amendment and 
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under a one-year contract.49 At the end of the year, the school declined to 
rehire him, but gave no reason for its decision.50 Roth then sued the 
school for violating his procedural due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.51 In addressing his claims, the Court held that 
whether due process is required depends on the “nature of the interest at 
stake,” as the amendment protects persons from deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property.52 
The Court broadly interpreted liberty interests to include “freedom 
from bodily restraint[,] . . . the right . . . to contract, to engage in any of 
the common occupations of life,” to learn, to marry, to make a home, to 
raise children, to worship “according to the dictates of [one’s] own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”53 Additionally, 
injuries to reputation could, on occasion, implicate a protected liberty 
interest.54 
By contrast, the Court took a narrower approach in defining a 
protected property interest. The Court stated that the “procedural 
protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a 
person has already acquired in specific benefits.”55 Property interests are 
created and circumscribed by “existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law.”56 In order for an 
individual to have a property interest in a benefit, that individual must 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to, not just an “abstract need” or 
“unilateral expectation” for, the benefit.57 
Ultimately, Roth had neither a liberty nor a property interest in his 
continued employment sufficient to trigger due process. While the school 
did not renew Roth’s one-year employment contract, it also did not level 
any charges against him that would have harmed his reputation or 
standing in the community or his chances of future employment.58 Thus, 
 
citing Roth). 
 49. Id. at 566. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 569. 
 52. Id. at 571. 
 53. Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 54. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (“Where a person’s good name, 
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and 
an opportunity to be heard are essential.”). But see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1991) 
(defamation does not implicate a protected liberty interest); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–02 (1976) 
(same). 
 55. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576. 
 56. Id. at 577. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 573–74. 
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there was no liberty interest at stake.59 Furthermore, he did not have 
tenure, which would have implicated a protected property interest by 
entitling him to continued employment.60 
Subsequently, part of the analysis of whether or not a protected 
interest is created focuses on the extent to which an agency’s discretion is 
restricted by statutes, rules, or regulations, because those restrictions 
condition claims of entitlement and set ascertainable standards for state 
action.61 As articulated in Roth, Wisconsin state law did not contain any 
eligibility requirements for continued employment other than tenure: 
“State law thus clearly leaves the decision whether to rehire a 
nontenured teacher for another year to the unfettered discretion of 
university officials.”62 Consequently, no protected property interest was 
created. Similarly, in Meachum v. Fano, a later case addressing liberty 
interests of prisoners, the Court stated, “Whatever expectation the 
prisoner may have in remaining at a particular prison . . . is too 
ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process 
protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for 
whatever reason or for no reason at all.”63 If the prison officials could 
transfer prisoners only for cause or for certain reasons specified by a 
statute or regulation, then perhaps a protected liberty interest would 
have been implicated, triggering due process.64 As described below, the 
California Supreme Court took particular exception to the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on state legislatures to establish protected interests.65 
2. Procedural Sufficiency 
While the essence of adequate due process is notice and an 
opportunity to be heard,66 the amount and type of procedure required 
varies according to the circumstances of a particular case.67 Due process 
 
 59. Id. at 575. 
 60. Id. at 567, 569. 
 61. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (stating that 
property interests are created by “independent source[s] . . . that support claims of entitlement 
to . . . benefits”); People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 625 (Cal. 1979) (“When the asserted interest is 
derived exclusively from state law, it will be recognized as within the scope of due process liberty if the 
state statute protects the interest by permitting its forfeiture only on the happening of specified 
conditions.”). 
 62. Roth, 408 U.S. at 567. 
 63. 427 U.S. at 228. 
 64. See id. This analysis of liberty interests is notably more restrictive than the Roth analysis. 
However, Meachum concerned the liberty interest of individuals already deprived of liberty, and, as a 
result, addressed that interest in an already-restricted context. Additionally, Meachum was decided 
post-Roth, and in Roth, the Court in fact noted that there were “boundaries” to the terms “liberty” 
and “property” in the Fourteenth Amendment. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. 
 65. See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
 66. See authorities cited supra note 15. 
 67. E.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972) (“[N]ot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”); 
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is a flexible concept,68 and courts examine procedural sufficiency in light 
of the facts before them.69 Hence, what procedures are due ranges from 
formal trial-like proceedings to allowing for a single written response.70 
In Eldridge, the Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to evaluate 
the adequacy of existing procedures.71 There, the Court instructed that 
reviewing courts consider three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.72 
The Court then balanced the petitioner’s interests in having a hearing 
prior to the termination of his disability benefits with the government’s 
interest in conserving resources by providing less procedure than a full 
judicial hearing.73 On balance, the petitioner was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing prior to the local Social Security office’s decision to 
terminate his disability benefits, because existing procedures satisfied 
procedural due process.74 Those procedures included an initial notice that 
stated the reasons for an adverse preliminary determination and 
provided an opportunity to respond prior to termination, a second notice 
upon termination that advised the petitioner of his right to seek the 
agency’s reconsideration, and a nonadversarial evidentiary hearing if the 
termination of petitioner’s benefits remained in effect after 
reconsideration.75 Accordingly, the risk in the existing procedures of 
erroneously ending petitioner’s benefits was relatively low, and 
additional procedures would have only increased costs without enhancing 
the accuracy of the determination.76 As an additional safeguard, the 
petitioner would have been entitled to retroactive payments if, at any 
time, the termination was found to be in error.77 
 
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Oberholzer v. 
Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 975 P.2d 663, 675–76 (Cal. 1999); Cal. Ass’n of PSES v. State Dep’t 
of Educ., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 68. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections 
as the particular situation demands.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627 (Cal. 1979). Sometimes, simply the availability of a 
damages suit after injury can be sufficient procedural protection. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 
430 U.S. 651, 677–79 & nn.45–47 (1977) (holding the same). 
 71. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 72. Id. at 335. 
 73. Id. at 348. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 337–39, 349. 
 76. See id. at 342–45. 
 77. Id. at 339. 
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In short, as a threshold matter for due process protections in the 
administrative context, a person subject to an agency action can invoke 
procedural due process protections if the state action implicates a liberty 
or property interest encompassed by the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments. Once due process is implicated, the sufficiency of the 
available procedures is evaluated based on a balance of three factors: (1) 
the private interest in question, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation 
under existing procedures and the probable value of additional 
procedures, and (3) the government’s interest in the action and 
proceeding.78 As Part I.B. describes below, California built upon the 
federal analysis in establishing its own doctrine for procedural due 
process in the administrative context. 
B. California’s Approach to Procedural Due Process 
Like the United States Constitution, the California Constitution 
provides that “[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”79 Despite the similarities between the 
constitutional provisions, the development of California’s procedural due 
process doctrine mirrors the development of the federal counterpart in 
some ways, but rejects it in others. In 1979, the California Supreme Court 
expressly critiqued the Supreme Court’s approach in Roth and set forth a 
new framework for procedural due process in California in People v. 
Ramirez.80 
In Ramirez, the appellant had previously been convicted of drug 
possession and was committed to the California Rehabilitation Center 
(“CRC”) for addiction treatment.81 He was later granted outpatient status 
pursuant to section 3151 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code,82 
was subsequently arrested for disturbing the peace and resisting arrest, and 
then was determined to be “‘not a fit subject for confinement or treatment’ 
in the CRC.”83 Ramirez challenged his exclusion from the treatment 
center, arguing that the agency’s decisionmaking procedures denied him 
due process.84 The California Supreme Court agreed, and redrew the 
framework for both the trigger for due process protections and the test for 
procedural sufficiency. The court took issue with two aspects of the federal 
approach in particular. First, the court objected to the state’s ability under 
 
 78. Id. at 335. 
 79. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7(a). The California Constitution has a similar, though separately 
enumerated, due process clause for criminal cases: “Persons may not . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.” Id. § 15. 
 80. See 599 P.2d 622, 625–28 (Cal. 1979). 
 81. Id. at 624. 
 82. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 3151 (West 2008). 
 83. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 624 (quoting the Director of Corrections). 
 84. Id. at 625. 
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the federal framework to write a protected interest out of a statute by 
providing the agency with unlimited discretion.85 Specifically, when the 
legislature does so, it effectively eliminates the trigger for due process 
under the United States Constitution.86 Second, the court felt that the 
balancing test for procedural safeguards failed to account for the values 
underlying due process.87 The Ramirez tests purportedly address these 
concerns. But, in fact, the language of the due process trigger is easily 
subject to multiple interpretations, and the test for procedural sufficiency 
is unevenly applied. Consequently, California’s due process doctrine has 
been muddled ever since Ramirez.  
1. Invoking Due Process 
In Ramirez, the California Supreme Court focused on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s requirement that a liberty or property interest, as defined 
by state law or other independent, nonconstitutional source of law, be 
implicated in order to trigger any due process right.88 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Mosk criticized this requirement, stating, 
Its effect is that as long as the interest is not one that would otherwise 
fall within the scope of constitutional concepts of liberty, the state may 
“define it out” of the due process clause by specifying that it is subject 
to the unconditional discretion of the person in charge of its 
administration.89 
Additionally, “the state may apparently limit the scope of the 
clause . . . irrespective of the extent to which ‘grievous loss’ or ‘substantial 
adverse impact’ results.”90 
According to the court, requiring statutory constraints on agency power 
in order to trigger due process did not sufficiently account for the 
importance of “promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability in 
governmental decision making when individuals are subject to deprivatory 
action.”91 The court maintained that if the principal purpose of due process 
is to minimize abuses of government discretion, then courts “must evaluate 
the extent to which procedural protections can be tailored to promote more 
accurate and reliable administrative decisions,” instead of evaluating 
“whether or not the state limits administrative control over a statutory 
benefit or deprivation by the occurrence of specified conditions . . . .”92 
 
 85. Id. at 626. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 625. 
 89. Id. at 626. 
 90. Id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 
242 (1976)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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In other words, if one of the purposes of due process is to protect 
individuals from arbitrary government action, then relying on the legislature 
to create a protectable liberty or property interest defeats that very purpose. 
Indeed, the more discretion an agency has, the greater the risk that an 
agency action will arbitrarily harm an individual.93 “[I]f agencies or officials 
administering entitlement programs fail to devise, adopt or implement 
processes for deprivatory action that respond to inherent dignitary values, it 
seems highly unlikely that such processes will be imposed upon them 
through nonjudicial means.”94 Essentially the court’s point was that a state 
legislature could write a legitimate liberty or property interest out of a 
statute by declining to limit an agency’s discretion. An agency with unlimited 
discretion is, of course, unlikely to voluntarily limit its exercise of that power. 
And, an individual at the mercy of the agency is more likely to be subjected 
to an arbitrary government action with neither adequate procedural 
protections nor recourse to obtain them, because the statute at issue created 
no trigger. Thus, the federal trigger fails to minimize abuses of government 
discretion. 
In short, although the Ramirez court might have ultimately agreed with 
the outcome under the federal due process analysis,95 it explicitly rejected 
the federal framework in determining whether the Director of Corrections’s 
decision to change the defendant’s status in the CRC’s program implicated 
procedural due process.96 The court stated, 
[W]hen a person is deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, due 
process analysis must start not with a[n] . . . attempt to decide whether 
the statute has created an “entitlement” that can be defined as ‘liberty’ 
or “property,” but with an assessment of what procedural protections 
are constitutionally required in light of the governmental and private 
interests at stake.97 
The court went on to hold that “due process safeguards required for 
protection of an individual’s statutory interests must be analyzed in the 
context of the principle that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures 
is a substantive element of one’s liberty.”98 
As might be expected, the language of the opinion naturally leads to 
multiple interpretations of the appropriate due process trigger. The 
application of Ramirez in the lower courts amply demonstrates the 
confusion Mosk’s opinion and its newly-announced principles 
engendered.99 On the one hand, in light of the court’s concerns with the 
amount of deference to state legislatures, the reference to a statutorily 
 
 93. See id. at 625–26. 
 94. Saphire, supra note 11, at 143. 
 95. See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 625–26. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 624 (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at 627 (emphasis added). 
 99. See discussion infra Part II. 
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conferred benefit or interest implies a natural due process trigger created 
by statute, regardless of the amount or degree of statutory limitations on 
an administering agency’s discretion. Procedural sufficiency would then be 
analyzed by balancing the competing private and government interests 
against the principle of freedom from arbitrary government action. In light 
of the court’s grave concern with the ability of a state legislature to write in 
or deliberately omit a trigger for procedural protections, it is also unclear 
whether the court intended for the presence of a statutorily conferred 
benefit to serve as part of a trigger, or if it is mentioned simply because 
Ramirez was granted outpatient status pursuant to provisions of the 
California Welfare and Institutions Code. Indeed, another interpretation 
of the opinion is that the tests set forth in Ramirez only apply in those 
circumstances where the legislature happens to have specifically provided 
a benefit; another due process trigger—though undefined in Ramirez—
would be implicated where no statutorily conferred benefit existed.100 
On the other hand, Ramirez also appears to state that the appropriate 
inquiry for triggering due process is whether procedural protections are 
constitutionally required based on a balance of the private and 
governmental interests, rather than on the statutory creation of a benefit 
or interest. In other words, the balance of the interests is “separate and 
independent” from the terms of a statute—not based simply on the 
interests identified in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.101 If this is 
accurate, then the California Supreme Court apparently tried to revisit the 
due process trigger set forth in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers—where 
procedural due process was required when a private interest could be 
characterized as a right, rather than a privilege102—except that the Ramirez 
court did not expressly return to the rights-versus-privilege dichotomy. 
Indeed, the court appears to have applied the balancing test as the trigger 
 
 100. At least one appellate court has adopted this interpretation. See Schultz v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 911–12 (Ct. App. 1984) (“We also conclude that People v. Ramirez, 
which sets forth a test for invocation of procedural due process rights under the state Constitution 
(where a statutory interest is subject to deprivation), should not be extended to this case, which 
implicates no statutory interest. Rather, we conclude Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. continues to define 
the circumstances in which procedural protections of due process will be afforded employees of public 
entities who can show no statutory interest subject to deprivation.” (citations omitted)). See generally 
discussion infra Part II.A. 
 101. See, e.g., Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 214 (Cal. 1980) (“In [Ramirez], this court held that 
the extent to which procedural due process relief is available under the California Constitution 
depends on a careful weighing of the private and governmental interests involved.” (internal citations 
omitted)). The court specifically differentiated between the federal test and the state test on the 
grounds that the federal test required a finding of a protected interest. Id. at 214 n.6; see also 
Hernandez v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 634 P.2d 917, 923 n.12 (Cal. 1981) (“[O]ur court recognized 
that under the California Constitution ‘freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a 
substantive element of one’s liberty’ so that ‘when an individual is subjected to deprivatory 
governmental action, he always has a due process liberty interest both in fair and unprejudiced 
decision-making and in being treated with respect and dignity.’” (quoting Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 622)). 
 102. 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
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in Ramirez: The opinion describes and weighs the interests at stake before 
concluding that due process was implicated and greater procedural 
protections were required.103 
The foregoing interpretations result in broader, more inclusive due 
process triggers than are possible under the federal framework, if for no 
other reason than because they abandon the restrictive categories of 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty and property interests. But, competing 
interpretations provide murky guidance to lower appellate courts. The 
degree of ambiguity in the Ramirez test is evident in opinions from these 
courts, where confusion about which methodology to apply is rampant. As 
Part II.A describes below, some courts have adhered to the view that 
procedural due process is implicated on a balance of the interests involved 
and in light of the principle of protecting people from arbitrary actions. 
Others have relied on the phrase “statutorily conferred benefit” to limit 
the scope of the due process trigger.104 Especially given its departure from 
an already-established test, the court’s failure to clearly define its own due 
process trigger is extremely problematic for establishing and maintaining 
vigorous procedural protections for individuals facing the administrative 
state: It is unclear when a person’s rights will be affected such that she 
must receive due process protections. Though due process is a flexible 
concept, the Ramirez court’s trigger analysis is overly elastic. Perhaps 
ironically, critical questions of fairness are raised when individuals—let 
alone agencies, the state legislature, and the courts—are unclear about 
when procedural protections are due because the court has failed to 
delineate the trigger clearly. Moreover, the lack of clarity induces chaos in 
the lower courts. Faced with mixed signals, lower courts increasingly fall 
back on the more definite federal due process trigger, which the California 
Supreme Court has expressly rejected. 
2. Procedural Sufficiency 
In addition to its concern about the federal trigger for due process, 
the Ramirez court objected to the balancing test articulated in Eldridge. 
Specifically, the court opined that the federal trigger failed to recognize 
“the dignity and worth of the individual by treating [her] as an equal, fully 
participating and responsible member of society.”105 The harm caused by a 
government treating an individual as a “nonperson”106 is so grave that, 
 
 103. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 631–32. Ramirez had interests in receiving notice of (including the 
reasons for) the termination of his outpatient status, in ensuring that the determination was based on 
accurate information, and in having an opportunity to make his case to the Director. Id. at 631–32. The 
government’s interests were in maintaining the safety and progress of the other participants, as well as 
evaluating the probabilities of successful rehabilitation. Id. at 630. 
 104. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 105. See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626. 
 106. Id. (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. 
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even where additional procedure would not change the agency 
determination, “due process may nevertheless require that certain 
procedural protections be granted . . . in order to protect important 
dignitary values” and to affirm an individual’s personhood.107 
In light of these concerns, the California Supreme Court recast the 
test for determining the safeguards required by procedural due process. 
Returning to the “touchstone of due process,”108 the court held that the 
procedure due must be viewed in light of the underlying precept that 
“freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive element 
of one’s liberty.”109 As with the federal test, the extent and nature of the 
procedure due depends on a balancing of interests at stake in each 
context.110 In addition to the Eldridge factors, California courts were 
directed to consider a “dignitary interest in informing individuals of the 
nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to 
present their side of the story before a responsible governmental 
official.”111 
In Ramirez, the court ultimately held that the defendant was entitled 
to additional procedural safeguards when the CRC ordered his exclusion 
from the rehabilitation program,112 with little procedural protection beyond 
subsequent judicial review.113 Ramirez was entitled to an opportunity to 
respond to the grounds for exclusion prior to the final decision; such an 
opportunity was meaningful if Ramirez received a written statement of the 
reasons for exclusion, access to the information considered in making the 
determination, “notice of [his] right to respond,” and a chance to respond 
orally.114 
Overall, both of these California due process analyses differ from 
their federal counterparts. First, where the federal analysis of procedural 
due process focuses on interests encompassed by the protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the California approach focuses on a broader 
protection of individual interests and benefits. Specifically, the California 
procedural due process trigger appears to require either that a person’s 
private interests outweigh those of the government such that due process is 
necessary to guard against arbitrary state action, or that an individual be 
 
L. Rev. 1, 30 (1977)). 
 107. Id. at 626–27. 
 108. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). 
 109. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 628. 
 112. Id. at 625. 
 113. Id. at 631. 
 114. Id. at 631–32. Ultimately, the court vacated the judgment below because the defendant was no 
longer “in custody under the judgments from which he appeal[ed]” and, consequently, remanding for a 
new exclusion hearing would have been inappropriate. Id. at 633. 
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deprived of a statutorily conferred interest.115 Second, the sufficiency of 
process depends on consideration of an additional factor in the balancing 
test—namely, the dignitary interest of providing notice and a hearing.116 
The next Part discusses the application of these two tests by California 
appellate courts. 
II.  The Application of RAMIREZ by the California Appellate 
Courts 
Once the California Supreme Court split from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence, the state’s lower courts were left to determine the 
contours of these new tests. As this Part demonstrates, California courts 
applied the Ramirez due process trigger to encompass a wider range of 
interests and benefits than covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
failed to interpret the trigger uniformly. Furthermore, the four-factor 
balancing test for procedural sufficiency has, by and large, proven to be 
neither more expansive nor more accommodating to a person’s dignity 
than the federal three-factor balancing test. 
A. Invoking Due Process 
Unlike the federal test, neither a property nor a liberty interest 
covered by the Fourteenth Amendment is a prerequisite for due process 
protections under Ramirez.117 Left unsettled, however, is what the 
prerequisites actually are. In the fifteen years after Ramirez, the test was 
applied primarily in criminal, juvenile, and mental health cases, as well as 
in a few employment cases.118 By 1984, the California Supreme Court had 
yet to apply Ramirez to a situation where no statutorily conferred benefit 
or interest existed—but it had made broad statements regarding the 
applicability of the test.119 
Since Ramirez, some courts have interpreted the California 
procedural trigger solely based on balancing private and governmental 
interests, and on considerations of arbitrariness in existing procedures. For 
example, in Saleeby v. State Bar, the California legislature had authorized 
the creation of the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) in section 6140.5 of the 
Business and Professions Code;120 the State Bar established the fund and 
 
 115. See id. at 627; see also Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 534–35 (Cal. 1985). 
 116. Ramirez, 599 P. 2d at 627–28. 
 117. See Schultz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 922 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 118. Id. at 918 n.7. 
 119. Id. at 919 (discussing the California Supreme Court’s use of Ramirez in Hernandez v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 634 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1981), and Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210 (Cal. 
1980)); see also Saleeby, 702 P.2d at 534–35 (holding that plaintiff was entitled to due process where 
plaintiff’s interest was statutory but not necessarily a liberty or property interest); Las Lomas Land 
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 518 (Ct. App. 2009); Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic 
Fed’n, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 816–17 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 120. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6140.5 (West 2008).  
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created rules and regulations for its administration.121 The petitioner 
sought reimbursement from the CSF, but only received partial 
compensation.122 Under the federal approach, the petitioner would not 
have been entitled to procedural due process, because the Bar’s discretion 
in disbursing money from the CSF was not restricted by the statute; 
Saleeby thus had no right to, or property interest in, an award from the 
CSF.123 However, the petitioner had a right to procedure under the 
California approach where “the announced grounds [of the agency’s 
decision were] patently arbitrary or discriminatory.”124 The court held that 
procedural due process was triggered, in part because the petitioner did 
not have a chance to respond to assertions made in the course of the 
reimbursement determination.125 He was also not provided with the 
reasons for the determination.126 Thus, the determination was ultimately 
arbitrary, and due process protections were required. 
However, many lower courts applying the trigger for due process 
articulated in Ramirez interpreted the test narrowly to require a statutorily 
conferred benefit or interest.127 The language of the Ramirez opinion 
seems to support this interpretation in its reference to deprivation of a 
statutorily conferred benefit.128 For example, in In re Thomas, a doctor 
jailed on drug-related charges applied to participate in a work furlough 
program and was denied.129 He challenged the decision as a violation of 
procedural due process.130 The court acknowledged the creation of a 
benefit under section 1208 of the California Penal Code131 in the work 
furlough program and proceeded to examine the procedures afforded.132 
The doctor would not have been entitled to procedural due process under 
the federal analysis, because the statute gave the program administrator 
 
 121. 702 P.2d at 528–29. 
 122. Id. at 527. 
 123. Id. at 536. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 535–36. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., Schultz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 918 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(“One key unsettled question is whether Ramirez’ analysis will be applied to situations . . . where no 
statutory right is at issue.”). Another example is Smith v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, where a 
doctor who was ordered to undergo a professional competency exam did not have a protected liberty 
or property interest that would trigger due process under the federal framework. 248 Cal. Rptr. 704, 
709–10 (Ct. App. 1988). However, his procedural due process rights were implicated under the 
California framework, because he had a statutorily conferred benefit or interest. Id. at 710–11; see also 
San Jose Police Officers Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 245 Cal. Rptr. 728, 731–32 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 128. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 624 (Cal. 1979). 
 129. 206 Cal. Rptr. 719, 720–22 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 130. Id. at 722. 
 131. Cal. Penal. Code § 1208 (West 2010).  
 132. 206 Cal. Rptr. at 723. 
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unfettered discretion and thus did not create a liberty or property interest 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.133 
Likewise, the court in Schultz v. Regents of the University of 
California maintained that due process was triggered by a statutorily 
conferred benefit or interest; otherwise, an individual would have to 
identify an interest covered by the Fourteenth Amendment.134 In that case, 
the plaintiff contended that the procedures used to reclassify his job 
violated due process.135 The court disagreed, maintaining that neither a 
statutorily conferred benefit nor an interest encompassed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment was implicated to trigger due process.136 
Similarly, the court in Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation 
required a statutorily conferred benefit in order to trigger California 
procedural due process protections.137 In that case, the plaintiff challenged 
a decision that deemed him ineligible to play on a high school football 
team.138 The plaintiff’s due process rights were not triggered, because he 
did not identify a statutorily conferred benefit or interest in his 
participation.139  
Finally, the court in Gresher v. Anderson ruled that the existence of a 
statutorily conferred benefit or interest was a threshold matter for due 
process protections.140 There, the plaintiff sued the Department of Social 
Services for procedural due process violations.141 The agency had 
developed procedures for exempting certain community care facility 
employees from a ban against hiring individuals with certain criminal 
convictions.142 The availability of an exemption for these individuals was a 
statutorily conferred benefit; hence due process was triggered under 
Ramirez.143 
These interpretations of the Ramirez due process trigger undermine 
the precise goal that the California Supreme Court sought to achieve, 
which is more explicitly articulated in the balancing test: recognition of an 
 
 133. Id. at 724. 
 134. 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 919 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Skelly v. State Pers. Bd., 539 P.2d 774, 782–83 
(Cal. 1975)). 
 135. Id. at 911–13. 
 136. Id. at 922. 
 137. 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 816 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 138. Id. at 803–04. 
 139. Id. at 817. 
 140. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 418–19 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 141. Id. at 411. 
 142. Id. at 411–13. 
 143. See id. at 418–19. Arguably, the interest in continued employment was a property interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the court addressed this only in passing. Id. at 419 
(“The Department denies that any private interest cognizable under the federal or state due process 
clauses is affected by the ‘exemption needed’ letters. However it is beyond dispute that both these 
clauses ‘protect[] the pursuit of one’s profession from abridgment by arbitrary state action.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Endler v. Schutzbank, 436 P.2d 297, 302 (1968))). 
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individual’s dignity in administrative adjudications. Paradoxically, differing 
interpretations in the appellate courts deprive affected parties of notice, 
because it is unclear which interpretation a court will apply and find due 
process implicated. The opacity of the language in Ramirez leads appellate 
courts to choose these different paths, and the Ramirez trigger therefore 
prevents courts from reaching the objective of Ramirez. Although the poor 
guidance from the California Supreme Court is troubling and leads to 
unpredictable results, procedural due process is still triggered in California 
where it would not be under the federal framework of circumscribed 
liberty and property interests.144 But, the question remains as to what 
extent the balancing test expands on the federal base. 
B. Procedural Sufficiency 
In requiring courts to consider a dignitary interest, the California 
Supreme Court addressed one of its central concerns with the federal 
balancing test—that the approach undervalued the importance of 
treating an individual “as an equal, fully participating and responsible 
member of society.”145 The dignitary interest factor implicates the quality 
and sufficiency of the two core components of due process: notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.146 In refocusing the due process test on the 
dignity of the individual affected by the governmental action, the 
California Supreme Court acknowledged that due process may require 
greater procedures, even where the outcome of a decision would be the 
same, in order to value a person’s dignitary interest.147 For example, in 
Ramirez, the dignitary factor led the court to require the Director of the 
CRC to provide an excluded prisoner with a “right to respond orally” to 
the agency’s decision.148 
However, California courts unevenly apply the Ramirez test for 
procedural sufficiency—particularly the dignitary interest factor—under 
the best circumstances. The opinions fall into three categories: decisions 
that continue to apply the federal test without mentioning Ramirez,149 
decisions that mention Ramirez but either conflate it with the federal test 
or apply only the federal test,150 and decisions that apply Ramirez.151 With 
respect to the last category, the dignitary interest appears to be most 
discussed in those cases where the plaintiff is deprived of benefits and 
interests, such as employment, due to a criminal record. Even in these 
 
 144. See, e.g., Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 534 (Cal. 1985); Ryan, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814. 
 145. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626–27 (Cal. 1979). 
 146. See authorities cited supra note 15. 
 147. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27. 
 148. Id. at 631. 
 149. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 150. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 151. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
Tosdal_62-HLJ-1003 (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2011 12:33 PM 
1024 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1003 
cases, courts perhaps invoke the dignitary factor more often because the 
facts more easily lend to such a consideration, rather than because the 
courts feel compelled to do so in light of Ramirez. 
1. The Application of the Federal Test 
A number of courts continue to apply solely the federal test. For 
instance, the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate 
District applied the Eldridge balancing test to decide that due process 
was satisfied in Mohilef v. Janovici, where the city made a determination 
affecting a couple’s use of their own land.152 Similarly, in Holmes v. 
Hallinan, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District 
applied the Eldridge test without even mentioning the Ramirez test.153 In 
that case, the court held that due process was unquestionably satisfied 
where a fired police officer was provided a hearing, which was necessary 
to resolve factual disputes and credibility determinations, and which he 
chose not to attend despite his opportunity to do so.154 Practically 
speaking, these protections may be the full panoply of procedure 
available under any test, and it is unclear what, if any, additional 
protections the police officer could have received had the court applied 
some iteration of Ramirez. Likewise, in Marvin Lieblein, Inc. v. Shewry, 
the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District held that, under the 
Eldridge test, due process did not require that the plaintiff, a pharmacist 
whose re-enrollment as a Medi-Cal provider was denied, be afforded live 
testimony and an evidentiary hearing.155 The court held that the reasons 
the U.S. Supreme Court put forth in Eldridge for declining to require 
additional procedures “appl[ied] with equal force”156 to the case at hand. 
Those reasons were, namely, that the evidence was objective, the 
plaintiff received notice of the evidence and the agency’s reasoning for 
its decision, the plaintiff was entitled to counsel and to present his case 
when challenging an adverse decision, the costs and burdens on the 
agency of providing these additional procedures would be significant, 
and little benefit would be incurred by adding procedures.157 
The rationale behind the application of the federal test in some 
cases appears to be a belief that the scope and protections of procedural 
due process in California are coextensive with the scope and protections 
provided by the federal approach.158 At least one court has expressly 
 
 152. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 731 n.18 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 153. 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 179 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 154. Id. at 180. 
 155. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 560–61 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 156. Id. at 561. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., Sandrini Bros. v. Voss, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 767 n.2 (Ct. App. 1992) (“The state [due 
process] provision has been considered to be co-extensive with the federal, and the two provisions 
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limited the application of the Ramirez test, because it believed it to be 
too broad.159 Courts also appear to apply the federal test where there is 
some indication that the result would be the same under either analysis.160 
2. The Application of Both Tests 
Then there are those opinions that explicitly refer to the Ramirez 
factors for examining the sufficiency of the procedures provided but do 
not directly apply them,161 or, instead, conflate them with the Eldridge 
factors. For example, in Brown v. City of Los Angeles, the Court of 
Appeal for the Second Appellate District considered the processes due 
to a police officer whose pay grade was reduced by the Los Angeles 
Police Department.162 Brown successfully challenged the procedures the 
police department provided for contesting a pay grade determination.163 
The court mentioned both the Eldridge and Ramirez tests, listing the 
factors weighed in each,164 but it applied only the Eldridge factors and 
made no further mention of a dignitary interest.165 
Other justices in that court took the same approach in American 
Liberty Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Garamendi.166 There, the California Insurance 
Commissioner suspended the plaintiff’s license to act as a bail agent after 
a felony criminal complaint was filed against him.167 The plaintiff filed a 
petition for writ of mandate on the ground that the immediate 
suspension of the license violated due process because, among other 
claims, the statute did not permit a pre-deprivation hearing and allowed 
the suspension to be based solely on a criminal complaint.168 Although 
the court mentioned both Ramirez and Eldridge, it explicitly applied the 
Eldridge balancing test.169 Perhaps the court found the case similar to two 
U.S. Supreme Court cases applying the federal test, namely, Gilbert v. 
Homar and FDIC v. Mallen.170 On the other hand, while the court listed 
 
have been held to have the same scope and purpose.”(internal citation omitted)). However, the Court 
of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District cited two pre-Ramirez cases to support the proposition. See 
id. (citing Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 449–50 (Cal. 1974); Russell v. Carleson, 111 Cal. 
Rptr. 497, 502 (Ct. App. 1973)). 
 159. Schultz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 919 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 160. See Mohilef v. Janovici, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 731 n.18 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 161. See, e.g., id. 
 162. 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474, 477 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 163. Id. at 491. 
 164. Id. at 487–88. 
 165. Id. at 491. 
 166. 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 541 (Ct. App. 2006). Interestingly, a different panel of three appellate justices 
overturned the same trial judge’s rulings in both cases. 
 167. Id. at 544–45. 
 168. Id. at 545. 
 169. Id. at 550. 
 170. See id. at 550–52 (applying Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997), and FDIC v. Mallen, 486 
U.S. 230 (1988)). 
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the Ramirez factors, it did so in an explanatory parenthetical and failed 
to note any distinction between the two tests.171 This strongly suggests 
that the court either conflated the two tests or discerned no difference 
between them, despite the additional dignitary interest factor. 
Interestingly, in Conservatorship of Tian L., a civil commitment case 
with facts particularly amenable to a discussion of the dignitary interest, 
the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District also 
commingled the federal and California due process approaches with little 
discussion of the dignitary interest.172 While the court described both 
tests,173 it only applied the federal balancing test.174 It could be argued that 
the court considered the dignitary interest factor as part of its discussion 
of the private interests involved. In that portion of the opinion, the court 
acknowledged that “civil commitment to a mental hospital, despite its 
civil label, threatens a person’s liberty and dignity on as massive a scale 
as that traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”175 However, 
the dignitary interest factor tends to support more robust notice and 
hearing procedures, requirements that the court discussed within the 
context of existing safeguards instead of a person’s inherent dignity.176 
Moreover, the court did not address the dignitary interest as a separate 
component of the test.177 Thus, the court neither seriously accounted for 
nor applied a dignitary interest in rendering its decision. 
3. The Application of Ramirez and the Dignitary Interest Factor 
A number of other courts have applied or incorporated the 
dignitary interest into their analyses. For instance, in San Jose Police 
Officers Ass’n v. City of San Jose, the California Court of Appeal for the 
Sixth Appellate District reasoned that the plaintiff’s dignitary interest 
was sufficiently recognized, because he had the chance to ask questions, 
give his opinion, produce evidence, and “attempt to change the decision-
maker’s mind.”178 The plaintiff was a retired police officer who had been 
 
 171. See id. at 550. 
 172. 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 385–88 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 173. Id. at 385. 
 174. See id. at 385–88. 
 175. Id. at 385 (quoting Conservatorship of Christopher A., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 
2006)) (internal quotations marks omitted).  
 176. See id. at 386–87. 
 177. See id. at 385–89. 
 178. 245 Cal. Rptr. 728, 736 (Ct. App. 1988). Incidentally, the concurring justice wrote:  
I must cry out in protest whenever occasion arises against . . . the endeavor of the California 
Supreme Court to infuse different meaning into language of the California Constitution 
which is essentially identical to that of its federal counterpart, and thereby to accord certain 
Californians greater rights and others correspondingly less protection than are guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution. 
Id. at 737 (Brauer, J., concurring). 
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denied a certificate to carry a weapon in his retirement.179 Due process 
requirements were satisfied under the California approach in this case, 
but were not even triggered under the federal framework.180 Even more 
summarily than the San Jose Police Officers Ass’n court, the Court of 
Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District determined in Laird v. 
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board that the dignitary interest of an 
employee whose rehabilitation benefits were terminated favored a pre-
termination hearing.181 Without elaborating, the court stated, “[A]n 
employee whose rehabilitation benefits are terminated by internal 
administrative action without the opportunity to personally appear and 
explain his rehabilitation efforts and needs surely loses at least a 
modicum of dignity.”182 
California courts have also applied the Ramirez test in the context 
of public schools. In Ryan, the court for the Fourth Appellate District 
applied both the federal and state tests.183 The court found that the 
student, who had sued the California Interscholastic Federation for 
denying him eligibility to participate in after-school sports, did not have a 
constitutionally protected interest in that activity.184 Similarly, the 
student’s ability to participate in a high school football program was not 
a statutorily conferred benefit triggering due process under Ramirez.185 
Despite the absence of a trigger under either test, the court completed 
the Ramirez analysis of the adequacy of the procedures already 
provided.186 The court concluded that the procedures were sufficient and 
stated simply that the dignitary interest under Ramirez was satisfied by 
adequate notice to the parties.187 
One area where the courts particularly focus on the dignitary 
interest is when an individual’s prior criminal conviction prevents or 
denies her an opportunity to do something. For instance, in Gresher v. 
Anderson, the plaintiff challenged the California Department of Social 
Services’s procedures for exempting certain community care facility 
employees from a ban against employing individuals with criminal 
records.188 In that opinion, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate 
District conducted a full analysis under Ramirez of the adequacy of the 
 
 179. Id. at 729–30 (majority opinion). 
 180. Id. at 731 (“Indeed, it is doubtful whether appellants would have a due process claim under 
the federal Constitution.”). 
 181. 195 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47–48 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 182. Id.  
 183. Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 805–20 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 184. Id. at 803–04, 810. 
 185. Id. at 817. 
 186. See id. at 817–18. 
 187. Id. at 820. 
 188. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 411 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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procedures afforded by the agency.189 The agency’s protocol for notifying 
community care facility workers that they needed an exemption from the 
ban in order to be employed was to send a form letter “stating merely 
that the [agency] had ‘received criminal history’ . . . from the Department 
of Justice.”190 Without specifying the conviction, the form letter also 
asked for an explanation of the conviction and informed the recipient 
that they could get a copy of their criminal record from the Department 
of Justice.191 The Gresher court strongly objected to this form of notice. 
Relying on Ramirez to support the proposition that even where greater 
procedure would not change the ultimate outcome, more procedure may 
nonetheless be required to validate an individual’s dignitary interests,192 
the court reiterated that “[n]otice sufficient to enable a meaningful 
response is an indispensable element of due process.”193 Due to the lack 
of specificity in the notice, affected individuals were not provided with 
sufficient information to make a meaningful response. The court stated 
that “significant dignitary concerns are raised by a procedure in which 
the state informs persons only that it has received unspecified ‘criminal 
history’ about them and then requires a detailed explanation of each 
conviction as a condition of considering an exemption request.”194 
Similarly, in Doe v. Saenz, different justices from the same appellate 
district as in Gresher analyzed the procedures for notifying potential 
employees at community care facilities that they could not apply for an 
exemption from the ban because of the nature of their past convictions.195 
Under the statutory scheme, the Director of the Department of Social 
Services “could grant a criminal record exemption for convictions of 
certain crimes,” but had no discretion to grant exemptions for certain 
other, generally more violent, criminal convictions.196 When the 
Department notified individuals that they would be ineligible for an 
exemption, the notice contained no information about the nature of the 
nonexempt offense, leaving the individual to seek information from the 
Department of Justice.197 The court found Gresher to be controlling198 and 
decided that due process was not satisfied.199 With respect to the dignitary 
interest, the court stated, “A notice vaguely referring to a criminal 
conviction that permanently bars an individual from working in 
 
 189. Id. at 418–22. 
 190. Id. at 417. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 421 (citing Ramirez). 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 126, 129–30 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 196. Id. at 131. 
 197. Id. at 132–33. 
 198. Id. at 147. 
 199. Id. at 149–50. 
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community care facilities violates the dignitary interest one has in 
understanding the nature, grounds, and consequences of governmental 
action.”200 The concerns raised in Gresher were even graver in Saenz, 
where inadequate notice was provided to individuals convicted of 
offenses that the Department, in its discretion, deemed nonexemptible.201 
A notice reflecting a purely discretionary decision, and providing no 
rationale or basis provided, is a clear example of an apparently arbitrary 
agency decision. There is no meaningful opportunity to respond, because 
there is no meaningful basis for a response. Thus, not only does this 
procedure implicate the dignitary interest in being treated as a 
responsible human being, but it also offends the touchstone of due 
process.202 
Given that People v. Ramirez has been applied most often to cases 
with similar underlying facts, namely, those in which a criminal 
defendant is excluded from a government program, this may suggest that 
Ramirez has been limited to its facts. Shortly after the Ramirez decision, 
the Second Appellate District addressed the question of whether due 
process required pre-exclusion procedures where the petitioner’s 
application for work furlough status was denied on the basis of his prior 
convictions for narcotics offenses.203 The court evaluated the procedures 
due solely under Ramirez204 and conceptually linked the dignitary interest 
that would be served by greater procedures to the risk of error inherent 
in the existing procedures.205 Specifically, the court criticized the fact that, 
prior to the interview for the work furlough status, the applicant had not 
been informed of the criteria for approval or that “a potential ground for 
exclusion existed.”206 Moreover, the applicant was never “informed of 
why the nature of his conviction might exclude him from the program.”207 
Additionally, the applicant was not given the opportunity “to present 
additional witnesses or documents to address the [agency’s] concerns.”208 
Greater procedural protections would not only have decreased the risk 
of error in decisions to exclude, but would also have “serv[ed] the vital 
dignity interest” by clearly demonstrating that the applicant continues to 
be a valued member of society.209 
 
 200. Id. at 149. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (Cal. 
1979). 
 203. In re Thomas, 206 Cal. Rptr. 719, 721–23 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 204. See id. at 723. 
 205. See id. at 725–26. 
 206. Id. at 726. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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Nevertheless, the dignitary interest factor did not require a court to 
permit an individual to represent himself when facing involuntary civil 
commitment under the Sexually Violent Predators Act.210 That statute 
provided for the right to counsel; the “right to have access to relevant 
medical and psychological reports and records; the right to retain experts 
to perform an examination; the right to a probable cause hearing; [] the 
right to a jury trial; and the right to be present at the hearing.”211 The 
Sixth Appellate District decided that these procedures sufficiently 
protected the applicant’s dignitary interest, and that due process did not 
provide for a right to self-representation in those proceedings.212 
4. The Impact of the Dignitary Interest Factor 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, while the trigger for due 
process in California is, in fact, broader and more inclusive than the 
federal trigger, the dignitary interest factor in testing what procedures 
are due appears, thus far, to have little, if any, effect on the sufficiency of 
procedural protections. Only a few courts have required enhanced 
procedures: For example, the Ramirez court required an oral hearing, in 
part to validate the dignitary interest.213 Likewise, in the community care 
facility cases, courts required more specific and descriptive notice for 
individuals affected by the ban on employing people with certain 
criminal convictions. By contrast, many courts have required greater 
procedural protections for reasons other than a dignitary interest. These 
other factors, such as inadequate notice and insufficient response time, 
have been more compelling in the balance of interests than a dignitary 
interest in certain kinds of cases. For instance, the government’s actions 
in the community care facilities cases carried a high risk of erroneous 
deprivation.214 Although courts in those cases invoked the dignitary 
interest factor, it is far from clear that they required greater procedure 
based on that factor alone. The same can be said for the conservatorship 
cases.215 There, the courts mentioned the Ramirez factors but ultimately 
applied the federal due process framework and, in doing so, focused on 
the high risk of erroneous deprivation in particular.216 
Even as compared to cases in other state courts with similar sets of 
facts, the outcomes under the Ramirez balancing test appear to be no 
different than under the federal test. For instance, in People v. Beckler, 
 
 210. People v. Fraser, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 424, 437 (Ct. App. 2006). For California’s Sexually Violent 
Predator Act, see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 2008). 
 211. Fraser, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 437 (internal citations omitted). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 631–32. 
 214. E.g., Gresher v. Anderson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 419–20 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 215. E.g., Conservatorship of Tian L., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 385–89 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 216. See id. at 388–89. 
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the Illinois Supreme Court applied both the federal trigger and the 
federal balancing test to conclude that the defendant had not been 
afforded proper procedures.217 The defendant, who had previously 
pleaded guilty to burglary, was placed in supervised rehabilitation for 
treatment of a drug problem.218 He was subsequently deemed to be 
unlikely to be rehabilitated and his participation in the program was 
terminated without a hearing.219 The California Supreme Court reached 
the same conclusion in Ramirez, applying the then-new test.220 Similarly, 
in In re True, a civil commitment case, the Idaho Supreme Court used 
the federal rationale and framework in holding that a mental health 
patient was not afforded due process when her conditional release status 
was revoked, as the patient was provided neither notice nor a hearing.221 
Given that the Idaho court reached this result under the federal test, 
without the additional factor, the Ramirez court likely would also find 
that the patient was not afforded due process—though its rationale 
would likely focus on the dignitary interest of the mental health patient. 
The Ramirez court criticized the Eldridge Court for glossing over 
the fundamental tenets of due process—particularly the validation of an 
individual’s dignity in the face of arbitrary exercises of state power—and 
for creating a circular approach to due process.222 However, if “the [U.S. 
Supreme] Court . . . fashioned an approach to assess[] the validity of 
governmental action that . . . essentially drained due process of its basic 
function as a limitation on the exercise of governmental power[,]”223 the 
California Supreme Court did no better in its attempt to address those 
due process values. The California high court’s focus on individual 
dignity has not made the ad hoc application of due process analyses any 
more coherent, or, more importantly, any more expansive or robust, 
despite its promise to do so.224 California courts should seek to breathe 
life into the state’s procedural due process doctrine in order to achieve 
Ramirez’s initial promise. Thus, Part III proposes and evaluates a few 
options for the California courts to adopt in order to preserve dignity in 
due process. 
III.  New Directions for the California Courts 
In light of the incoherent definition and application of the California 
due process tests, California courts could pursue one of two paths: First, 
 
 217. 459 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
 218. Id. at 673. 
 219. Id. at 673–74. 
 220. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 221. 645 P.2d 891, 894 (Idaho 1982). 
 222. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (Cal. 1979). 
 223. Saphire, supra note 11, at 113. 
 224. See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27. 
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the courts could abandon the dignitary interest in the balancing test; 
second, courts could apply some force and meaning to the dignitary 
interest factor. This Part addresses each avenue in turn. In the end, 
giving force to the dignitary interest is not only more faithful to the 
purpose and vision of Ramirez, but it also serves to protect individuals 
from state action against which they would otherwise be defenseless. 
A. Disregarding Dignity 
Given the largely consistent application of the federal due process 
test, the inconsistent application of the California test, and the similarity 
of results under both tests, one could argue that attempting to breathe 
life into the dignitary interest factor would be an exercise in futility. 
However, in addition to contravening California Supreme Court 
precedent, this argument is highly problematic in light of the precepts 
underlying procedural due process. 
One argument for disregarding the dignitary interest factor could be 
that the California test already expands upon the federal threshold by 
virtue of the more inclusive trigger, in spite of the confusion about its 
parameters,225 and therefore by default, provides for greater procedural 
protection. In that regard, the dignitary interest is simply an extra factor 
with minimal impact on procedural sufficiency, because procedures are 
so readily available once due process is triggered. This objection, 
however, ignores the purpose of the dignitary interest: to affirm an 
individual’s personhood vis-à-vis the state. Expansion of available 
procedures may occur as a result of applying the factor, but that is not 
the principally intended effect of the dignitary interest factor: guarding 
individual rights from arbitrary actions by providing a person with the 
chance to be heard by the individual responsible for her fate.226 The most 
significant problem with this counterargument rests on the confusion 
over when due process is actually triggered. Dismissing the confusion 
over the trigger and ultimately relying on a poorly-defined test 
significantly devalues principles of procedural due process, not to 
mention rendering the availability of broader protections unpredictable. 
Another argument may be that the dignitary interest can simply be, 
and already is, subsumed under or recognized as part of one of the other 
 
 225. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 226. In weighing what procedures ought to be added, courts consider the cost of adding such 
protections to an agency’s adjudicatory process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); 
Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 628. For example, in Ramirez, the court required an oral hearing but did not 
require the CRC to allow more formal hearing rights, such as confrontation and cross-examination. 
599 P.2d at 631–32. Empirical data on the costs and benefits of applying the dignitary interest factor to 
compel greater procedures might shed additional light on the utility of the factor. Indeed, allowing a 
full, trial-like hearing may be prohibitively expensive in many cases, even so much as to outweigh the 
benefits of acknowledging human dignity. Such an inquiry is outside the scope of this Note, which 
addresses solely the focus that California’s due process inquiries ought to take. 
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factors in the balancing test, such as the private interest or the risk of 
erroneous deprivation. This also contradicts the California Supreme 
Court’s intent and purpose when it expressly disapproved of the federal 
rationale and attempted to reframe the balancing test.227 Indeed, in 
Ramirez, the court specifically identified the importance of recognizing a 
person as a responsible member of society and, hence, her inherent 
dignity as one of the core values of due process.228 Subsuming the 
dignitary interest under another factor fosters confusion amongst the 
lower courts, disregards California precedent, and diminishes the value 
of a person’s dignity when faced with administrative decisions. 
Finally, one could argue that greater procedures than are 
constitutionally required burden an already-overburdened administrative 
state with little appreciable benefit for the private individual. However, 
protecting individuals against arbitrary actions is, after all, the 
touchstone of due process.229 This principle ought to tip the delicate 
balance between efficiency and economy of government within the 
administrative state on the one hand, and the protection of individuals 
against state actions on the other, in favor of the individual. The state 
should bear the burden of its actions against its citizens, even though 
providing for more procedure would not necessarily result in a different 
outcome. 
B. Preserving Dignity 
In short, California courts should give full meaning to the dignitary 
interest factor. A test that is rarely applied fails to achieve the California 
Supreme Court’s intended focus on acknowledging and protecting 
dignity, and fails to recognize individuals as responsible and valued 
members of society. When confronted with a heightened possibility of 
arbitrary deprivation, an individual’s interest in maintaining her 
personhood is of paramount importance. Thus, the test should be 
redesigned to preserve dignity in due process. This could be achieved in 
one of two ways: using the dignitary interest to require oral procedures, 
 
 227. Justice Mosk was known for his socially liberal perspective on the bench, see In Memoriam: 
Honorable Stanley Mosk (1912–2001), Cal. Supreme Court Historical Soc’y, http://www.cschs.org/ 
02_history/images_c/02_c_mosk.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011), as well as for interpreting or basing 
opinions on the state constitution rather than on the federal counterpart. Interview by Germaine 
LaBerge with Stanley Mosk, Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, in S.F., Cal. 40–41 (Mar. 11, 1998), transcript 
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/oral-history/pdf/mosk.pdf. His judicial philosophy was that 
the state constitution is the governing body of law; consequently, he was “able to prevail on a number 
of issues using . . . state law primarily.” Interview by Germaine LaBerge with Stanley Mosk, Justice, 
supra, at 40. One such example is his position on limitations on an attorney’s right to exercise 
peremptory challenges in jury selection. Id. at 40–41 (discussing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
(1965), People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
 228. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626. 
 229. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889). 
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or rearticulating a new balancing test that prominently features the 
dignitary interest. 
First, the courts could interpret Ramirez as creating a presumption 
that oral proceedings are required in administrative adjudications. This 
of course interferes with the efficiency of the administrative state, but 
that is not necessarily too high a price to pay for more respectful 
government action. The most obvious argument is that oral proceedings, 
because they would not increase the accuracy of an administrative 
decision, while certainly increasing costs, are not always warranted. But, 
a presumption favoring oral proceedings could be rebutted in cases 
where such a procedure might be unduly burdensome—for example, in 
drivers license determinations. And, accuracy is a cold counterpoint to 
the simple act of being able to state one’s case and having the 
opportunity to receive answers. For instance, in cases like Ramirez or the 
civil commitment cases, oral proceedings affirm the individual’s dignitary 
interest. The same would be true in cases with less dramatic facts, as 
indicated by the Ramirez court’s statement that the dignitary interest 
could, on occasion, command greater procedures—such as oral 
proceedings—even though due process would have been otherwise 
satisfied in a given case:230 “[W]hen the concern is with inherent values 
[such as dignity], a right to oral participation seems essential.”231 
Although such holdings are rare, the best example would likely be 
Ramirez itself, as the court required oral hearings in part to address the 
dignitary concern.232 
If the Ramirez test is to operate as the balancing test for all due 
process questions under the California analysis, then there are a number 
of settings where greater procedures could be required, even though the 
existing ones may be sufficient. Adverse employment decisions and 
public education are two such contexts. For instance, a court could hold 
that an employee who was fired or demoted by an agency must be 
provided with a chance to respond orally to the reasons for the decision. 
Doing so would affirm the employee’s status as a valued member of 
society. A court could also require that a student or a teacher facing 
school discipline have a chance to respond orally to the possibility of 
disciplinary action. Such protection would not only afford greater 
acknowledgement of the individual as a person, but would also enhance 
the individual’s opportunity to be heard. 
Second, the courts could more closely associate the dignitary 
interest with one of the first two factors in the balancing test. In other 
words, instead of subsuming the dignitary interest under either the 
 
 230. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27. 
 231. Saphire, supra, note 11, at 164. 
 232. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 631. 
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private interest affected by the government action or the risk of 
erroneous deprivation factors, the balancing test could be rearticulated 
with the dignitary interest as one of three factors instead of one of four. 
For instance, the dignitary interest could replace the private interest as 
the first factor of the balancing test. Conceptually, this is possible 
because the private interest at stake is often the same as the trigger—the 
continued interest in employment or the benefit of being a patient at a 
rehabilitation facility—and is often related to a person’s sense of being a 
valued member of society. If the California Supreme Court had done so 
in Ramirez, its discussion of the private interest factor would have 
included not only a discussion of Ramirez’s interest in treatment, but also 
his private, dignitary interest in being afforded an opportunity to respond 
orally to the agency’s concerns about his status.233 His private interest in 
being heard is comparable to his dignitary interest in being treated with 
respect by the state. 
The dignitary interest could also replace the second factor, risk of 
error, as both relate to the accuracy and adequacy of the notice and 
hearing procedures provided prior to the deprivation. At least one lower 
court has done so, though perhaps not expressly. In Gresher v. Anderson, 
the court discussed the problems with the existing due process 
protections, focusing particularly on the quality of notice given to the 
affected individual.234 Vague notice led to an inadequate opportunity to 
respond.235 The court could also have framed its discussion of the high 
risk of erroneous deprivation as offending the individual’s dignitary 
interest. Put another way, the court could easily have argued that the 
vague and inadequate notice failed to account fully for the individual’s 
right to be treated and respected as a person—in addition to increasing 
the risk of error in the action—without applying both factors separately 
and independently. Either method of reforming the California balancing 
test appears more likely to focus successfully on the dignitary interest of 
the affected individual than the current method. Doing so would restore 
the import of a person’s dignity in the due process analysis. Moreover, as 
a three-factor test can be more facile in its application, changing the test 
in one of these manners would have the added benefit of bringing some 
coherence and legitimacy to California’s expansive due process 
approach. 
 
 233. See id. 
 234. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 421 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 235. Id. at 421–22; see also Doe v. Saenz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 126, 148–49 (Ct. App. 2006); In re 
Thomas, 206 Cal. Rptr. 719, 725–26 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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Conclusion 
Ensuring that due process is afforded to individuals who are 
subjected to adverse state action is especially difficult in the 
administrative context. Administrative agencies were created to delegate 
governing responsibility to another, albeit associated, branch of the 
government in the name of efficiency. Despite the benefits of such a 
system—and there are many—the risks to the individuals who rely on 
that system are great, because agencies are not fully democratically 
accountable. Due process, therefore, is especially important in the 
administrative context, because the chance of arbitrary state action 
increases as government agencies become less accountable. In balancing 
the purposes of due process and the needs of a modern administrative 
state, federal and California courts have reached two different 
conclusions on the scope and protection of due process. Although the 
California approach purports to be more inclusive, it is only partially so. 
While the trigger for procedural protections is more sensitive, it is also 
confounding. California appellate courts have struggled to interpret the 
Ramirez trigger for procedural due process. At least three different 
interpretations are viable, and though courts appear to apply one more 
commonly than the others, the ease with which courts reach these 
different interpretations raises significant concerns about whether 
fundamental precepts of due process—namely, dignity—are being 
fulfilled. Likewise, the test for determining procedural sufficiency 
acknowledges an individual’s personhood in a cursory fashion, if at all, 
because the high court has failed to delineate clearly the parameters and 
application of Ramirez. Given the risks of being subject to arbitrary state 
action in administrative contexts, the California Supreme Court’s 
attempt to focus the state test on a person’s dignity is valuable and ought 
to be pursued. One such way to accomplish this is to interpret Ramirez, 
the seminal case, as creating a presumption in favor of oral proceedings. 
Another, perhaps more effective, way would be to rearticulate the test 
with the dignitary factor as one of three factors instead of as a lost factor 
in a set of four. Either solution would enhance the coherence of the 
California due process test without disregarding either the state’s highest 
court or the dignitary interest of its residents. 
 
